

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Martin Gavino Guzman,)
Petitioner,)
v.)
Charles L. Ryan, et al.,) **ORDER**
Respondents.)

This matter was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and the local rules of practice of this Court for a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, which recommends that the Petition be denied and dismissed. The Petitioner filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation on November 18, 2009. Petitioner's objections reiterate the claims contained in the habeas petition and the reply to the Respondents' answer.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When objection is made to the findings and recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court must conduct a de novo review. *United States v. Reyna-Tapia*, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

2 Petitioner was convicted in Pima County Superior Court, case #CR
3 0051953, of molestation of a child, sexual conduct with a minor under 15,
4 and continuous sexual abuse of a child and was sentenced to life
5 imprisonment. Petitioner names Charles L. Ryan as Respondent in the
6 Petition and the Arizona Attorney General as an Additional Respondent.
7 Petitioner raises three grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner's sentence was
8 illegally enhanced, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;
9 (2) Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights to have a trier-of-fact determine
10 sentence enhancing factors, trial by jury, effective assistance of
11 counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and
12 to a speedy trial were violated; and (3) Petitioner's Fourteenth
13 Amendment equal protection and due process rights were violated.
14 Petitioner states that he has presented these claims to the Arizona Court
15 of Appeals.

16 Respondents, in a thorough and detailed review of Petitioner's
17 conviction, appeal and post-conviction litigation, argued as follows:

18 Petitioner's habeas corpus petition is untimely. The
19 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
20 (AEDPA) imposes a 1-year limitation period on state
21 prisoners filing habeas corpus petitions in federal court.

22 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period runs from "the
23 date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
24 of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
25 such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). "The time during
26 which a properly filed application for State post-conviction
27 or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

1 judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any
2 period of limitation." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here, the
3 Arizona Court of Appeals issued its memorandum decision
4 affirming all but one of Petitioner's convictions on
5 December 4, 1997... The Arizona Supreme Court denied review
6 of Petitioner's claims on September 24, 1998...Petitioner
7 filed his first notice of post conviction relief on May 1,
8 1998...Thus, no non-tolled time passed between the
9 completion of Petitioner's direct appeal and the filing of
10 his first notice of post conviction relief. The court of
11 appeals denied this petition on May 18, 2000... Once that
12 decision issued, Petitioner had no matter "pending" in state
13 court. Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run
14 on May 18, 2000, and Petitioner had until May 18, 2001 to
15 file his habeas petition. He did not, however, file his
16 petition until June 26, 2009.

17 Although Petitioner filed a second notice of post conviction
18 relief on December 26, 2008, this did not serve to extend
19 the time in which he could file a habeas petition. "The
20 tolling provision does not . . . revive the limitations
21 period (i.e. restart the clock at zero); it can only serve
22 to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. ***Once the***
limitations period is expired, collateral petitions can no
longer serve to avoid a statute of limitations." *Vroman v.*
25 *Brigano*, 346 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal
26 quotation marks omitted, emphasis added). Therefore,
27 Petitioner's filing of his second petition for post
28

1 conviction relief had no effect on the limitations period.
2 Further, Petitioner has failed to assert that any later date
3 for the start of the limitations period should apply. To the
4 extent that he asserts that *Blakely v. Washington*, 542 U.S.
5 296 (2004), mandates resentencing in his case, *Blakely* had
6 not been decided when Appellant's conviction became final
7 in 1997, and the United States Supreme Court has not made
8 *Blakely* "retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
9 review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C); see *Scott v. Schriro*,
10 567 F.3d 573, 578, n.3 (9th Cir. 2009) ("*Blakely* does not
11 apply retroactively to cases on collateral review."). Thus,
12 this case law does not serve to impose a later date for the
13 start of the limitations period. Because the habeas petition
14 is untimely, this Court should dismiss it with prejudice.

15 (Answer at 3-4.)

16 The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is thorough and
17 well-reasoned:

18 [T]he statute of limitations began to run on May 19, 2000,
19 the date that Petitioner's conviction became final and was
20 no longer tolled by pending Rule 32 Proceedings, not on the
21 date that the *Blakely* decision was issued.

22 The filing of Petitioner's Second Rule 32 Proceedings does
23 not affect this Court's conclusion that Petitioner's
24 limitations period is expired. It was not filed until
25 December 26, 2008, well after the federal statute of
26 limitations had expired. See *Ferguson v. Palmateer*, 321 F.3d
27 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 2244(d) does not

permit the re-initiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed). Equitable tolling may be available even after the statute of limitations period has expired if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time." *Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler)*, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, *Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.*, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)(en banc). Equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases. *Miranda v. Castro*, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting *Miles v. Prunty*, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) and *Beeler*, 128 F.3d at 1288). Petitioner has not argued that he was unable to timely file the pending petition due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.

The last day of the limitations period was May 19, 2001. The instant petition was filed on June 26, 2009. It is therefore time-barred.

(R&R at 4-5.)

Petitioner's Objections do not highlight any new or pertinent law or facts that were left unconsidered or unresolved by the R&R. The record unequivocally reflects that the statutory period to file a petition for federal habeas relief ran from May 19, 2000 through May 19, 2001, with no applicable equitable or statutory tolling events. The habeas petition was filed June 26, 2009 and is time-barred.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, after conducting a de novo review of the record,

IT IS ORDERED that the Court **ADOPTS** the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 12) in its entirety. The Objections raised by the Petitioner are **OVERRULED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1) is DENIED and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Final Judgment to enter separately.

DATED this 19th day of November, 2009.


David C. Bury
United States District Judge